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Parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Changing Legislative Institutions*
PETR KOPECKÝ**
Department of Political Science, Leiden University
Abstract. Parliaments emerged as one of the key political institutions in the post-
communist transition. Endowed with the significant power they acquired under
the old communist constitutions, they were assigned the task of drafting and rat-
ifying the new democratic constitutions in the transition period. Like most oth-
er institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, parliaments have undergone im-
portant changes in terms of how they function and in relation to their external
environment. This article provides an introductory overview of the changing na-
ture of parliaments in the region, focusing on two important areas of legislative
studies. The first part of the article looks at the role of parliaments in represen-
tation. The second part offers several generalisations about the relationship be-
tween parliaments and their respective executive branches. By reviewing these
two aspects of legislative process, some insights are also provided into the
changing internal workings and procedures of CEE parliaments. 
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Introduction
Modern democracies are unthinkable without parliaments. Parliament provides the
institutional platform for the interaction of intermediary agencies: the parties, in-
terest groups, or social movements that link them to society. Parliament also links
society with other democratic institutions, the executive, judiciary or state bureau-
cracy. In that sense, parliament is the key structure of representation. In every po-
litical system the parliament encompasses a wide range of institutions, rules and
procedures, and political organisations, and as such it can be viewed as the focal
point around which revolve all the crucial questions of political style, legitimacy and
democratic accountability. In addition, parliament is multifunctional: it legislates
(hence the frequently used reference to ‘the legislature’), i.e. it makes laws. Howev-
er, it is also the place where political elites are trained and socialised, where diverse
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ARTICLES
social groups and nationalities of one state are integrated, where national adminis-
tration is subjected to an oversight, and where the interests of society interests, and
frequently even public policies, are articulated.
The parliaments in communist Eastern Europe existed more or less as rubber-
stamping bodies. Although no Eastern European communist regime abandoned its
parliament, it was so subordinated to the Communist Party apparatus that particu-
larly its legislative activities and oversight functions were minimal, at least until the
1980s, when communist leaderships throughout the region began to lose their grip
on society [see Nelson and White 1982]. The wave of political change that swept
across Eastern Europe in the early 1990s propelled parliaments almost overnight
from institutions with very limited autonomy in decision-making into bodies that at
least initially became one of the key political players in each country. There were at
least two reasons for the pivotal role parliaments acquired. First, parliaments were
handed the task of drafting and ratifying the new democratic constitutions. This
presented them with an opportunity to cement a strong position for themselves
within the emerging political system. Second, parliaments were endowed with sig-
nificant powers from the start of the transition, as the previous communist consti-
tutions had made parliaments powerful institutions (at least on paper), and it was
these same constitutions that established the rules of the game under which the
new parliaments began operating in the post-communist era. 
However, like most other institutions in the region, parliaments have under-
gone numerous changes, both in their internal functioning and in relation to their ex-
ternal environment. They are clearly not the same institutions they were during and
immediately after the uncertain and extraordinary period of transition to democracy
(i.e. from 1989 to the mid-1990s). This article provides an introductory overview of
the changing nature of parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe1 (CEE), focusing
on two important areas of legislative studies. The first part of the article provides a
look at the role of parliaments in representation, while the second part presents sev-
eral generalisations concerning the relationship between parliament and the execu-
tive branch. By reviewing these two aspects of legislative process the final aim is to
provide some insights into the changing internal workings and procedures of CEE
parliaments. It should be noted that in this article the similarities between CEE par-
liaments are emphasised rather their differences. This of course does not mean that
there are no differences. CEE parliaments have always differed in many institution-
al and behavioural aspects and will continue to do so. However, by placing empha-
sis on similarities, the aim is to highlight the increasing degree of convergence be-
tween CEE parliaments and the parliaments in established (Western European)
democracies. 
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1 Central and Eastern Europe refers here to all eight new EU member states among the post-
communist countries, plus the three Balkan EU-candidate states; e.g. Bulgaria, Romania and
Croatia. It thus excludes Russia and most other former Soviet Republics, and several of the
Balkan countries. 
Parliaments and representation
Parliaments are the symbols of representation, perhaps more so than anything else.
Sometimes they are deliberately set up in such a way as to reflect a society’s socio-
cultural diversity. The communist legislatures tried to ensure the equal representa-
tion of women, peasants, workers, and national minorities, etc., and created parlia-
ments that were supposed to be more or less a mirror of their respective societies.
In most contemporary European democracies, it is political parties that are the key
agents of representation. Parties select and campaign on behalf of and provide lists
of representatives, who when elected sit in parliament and, if in control of a major-
ity, also form the government. This is a party government model of representation,
in which voters simply delegate their power to the political parties that best repre-
sent their political preferences. However, links between parliaments and the elec-
torate can also exist, especially in between the elections, through various forms of
constituency representation, wherein individual MPs promote the interests of par-
ticular geographical areas, sectors of society, or even individual constituents. 
These different models of representation are not mutually exclusive, and in
most political systems they to a large extent co-exist [see Andeweg and Thomassen
2003]. There is usually a set of informal practices that determine which particular
form of representation dominates, or what happens if conflicts between various
forms of representation arise; for example, if an individual MP is caught between
the interests of his or her constituents on the one hand and those of the government
on the other. Patterns of representation also depend on a range of formal political
institutions, most importantly the kind of electoral system and the nature of politi-
cal parties and party systems. In this the CEE parliaments are no exception: the de-
velopment of their links to the electorate has been greatly influenced by the nature
of post-communist parties, elections and electoral systems. It has also been greatly
affected by the particular structure of parliamentary membership.
Parties and elections
Organised political parties emerged relatively slowly in post-communist CEE. Ow-
ing in part to the strong anti-party sentiments among both the population and the
new political leaders [see Lewis 2000] and in part to the particularly suppressive na-
ture of the communist regimes, the early transition period was dominated by broad-
ly based anti-communist movements and umbrella organisations, such as Civic Fo-
rum and the Public Against Violence in former Czechoslovakia, the National Salva-
tion Front in Romania, Sajudis in Lithuania, and Demos in Slovenia. With a few ex-
ceptions, like Bulgaria, it was these movements that also won the first freely con-
tested parliamentary elections. 
Parties began to emerge only as these broad movements started to break up in
parliament during their first term in office. In this sense, parliaments performed one
very important function in the early stages of post-communist politics: they became
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the arenas in which new political alliances were forged and new political parties
were established. Given that most of the newly established parties were formed
from above and consequently lacked solid links with society on the whole, their sur-
vival would have been inconceivable without the institutional, logistical and often
also financial support that was provided to them by parliaments. 
However, the rapid and somewhat disorderly process of party formation had
negative consequences for the links between parliament and the electorate. Many
political parties disappeared during the first parliamentary term and other parties
were formed instead. For example, in contrast to the initial eight parliamentary par-
ties that were in the Federal Assembly in the former Czechoslovak Federal parlia-
ment in 1990, there were no fewer than sixteen parliamentary parties by the end of
1991. In Slovakia, eighteen parties and coalitions registered for the elections in 1994
but in fact represented 31 parties and movements. In addition, the composition of
parliamentary parties (clubs) frequently changed: members either switched to an-
other parliamentary group or became independent. In Slovakia, for example, 44 par-
liamentary seats (out of 150) shifted from one parliamentary party to another be-
tween the elections of 1990 and 1992; between the 1992 and 1994 elections 28 seats
shifted from one party to another [Malová and Krause 2000]. The parties themselves
often fractured into several sub-groupings, or disappeared altogether [Gillespie et
al. 1995; Kask 1996].
The fragmentation of parties and the party system caused a good deal of con-
fusion among voters and effectively prevented the formation of stable ties between
the representatives and the represented. However, it also affected the internal func-
tioning of parliaments because in the wake of such instability parliamentary party
leaders had to struggle to impose the party line on parliamentary party members.
Consequently, individual MPs introduced their own legislation, often against the
wishes of their party or the government coalition they represented, more frequent-
ly than they tend to in the established parliaments of Western Europe.
The links between parliament and the electorate are also shaped by the elec-
toral system. The system of proportional representation (PR) based on party lists
combined with large constituencies generally favours representation by parties
rather than the emergence of strong links between individual MPs and their con-
stituencies. In contrast, the majority system with single-member districts, such as
the British first-past-the post, is more favourable to the formation of such links. The
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have various electoral systems, but most
have adopted, for elections to the lower house, either a PR electoral system (e.g. Bul-
garia, Croatia, Czech Republic) or a mixed electoral system, where a part of the
house is elected on the basis of a PR system and a part in single-member con-
stituencies (e.g. Hungary, Lithuania). 
However, the key problem with electoral systems in the region has always been
the relatively frequent changes they have experienced. Manipulation of the electoral
system has been most visible in connection with establishing the legal thresholds for
entering parliament [see Shevtsova 1999]. For example, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland
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all raised these barriers during the 1990s in order to reduce the number of parties in
parliament. The Czech Republic has done so for coalitions of parties. The result of
these changes has been a reduction in the number of (parliamentary) parties, which
is certainly a positive development given the scale of party fragmentation that exist-
ed in some countries, such as Poland. However, other effects of this electoral engi-
neering are somewhat more questionable, for example, the large proportion of votes
‘wasted’ on the small parties that did not make it into parliament. Most importantly,
frequent tinkering with the electoral rules, for instance changing the size of electoral
districts, or making changes in how preferential votes  count, has also made it diffi-
cult for MPs to form links between themselves and their local constituencies.
Nevertheless, certain patterns are now emerging across the region as parties
and party systems have relatively stabilised and as the institutional framework of
the new democracies has become more and more settled. Parliamentarians are now
primarily anchored in their political parties, not least because MPs now owe their
career to the party rather than to their own personal qualities and personalities. Vot-
ers also note vote primarily for a political party rather than a particular individual.
Parties are therefore slowly emerging as the key agencies of representation, as they
are in most countries in Western Europe. Although the various forms of con-
stituency representation tend to be relatively underdeveloped in the region, re-
search in this area also suggests that some form of territorial and sectoral represen-
tation is becoming part of MPs’ working routines, for example, in Slovakia [Malová
and Siváková 1996] and Poland [van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 2000] and other
countries that use the mixed electoral systems [see Birch 2001]. 
Members
Many of the deputies that were in the first post-communist parliaments in CEE
came from the ranks of the opposition movements that existed in the region. In
some parliaments these movements won a majority after the first free elections (e.g.
Czechoslovakia, Poland), in other parliaments it was the (ex-)communist parties
that dominated (e.g. Bulgaria). The opposition movements themselves were largely
composed of intellectual elites, independent professionals and artists, who had con-
stituted the backbone of anti-communist dissent. As a result, the early parliaments,
especially those in which the opposition was victorious, managed to acquire legiti-
macy in the eyes of the population, as former dissidents replaced the communist-
era deputies and apparatchiks. In some cases, like in the former Czechoslovakia, the
replacement process actually occurred before the first democratic elections, as a re-
sult of agreements between the outgoing communist regime and the opposition dur-
ing round table negotiations after the Velvet Revolution. The Federal Assembly and
the Czech and Slovak National Councils purged themselves, and between one-third
and one-half of the MPs in the federal and national councils were replaced by can-
didates supported by the anti-communist opposition.
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However, the gains in terms of democratic legitimacy were offset by the inex-
perience of these new members in operating in a large organisation. Moreover, for-
mer dissidents were elected alongside a sizeable group of prominent actors and mu-
sicians, and their presence lent the electoral lists of newly formed and largely un-
known parties extra visibility and popularity. Although dissidents and artists often
displayed convincing rhetorical skill in parliamentary debates, they nonetheless had
poor organisational skills, and the loyalty they had to organisations like parliamen-
tary parties or parliamentary committees was weak. Ironically, it was the MPs of the
(ex-)communist parties that often turned out to be the more effective parliamentar-
ians, as they had already learned the necessary skills of negotiation, deal-making
and constituency representation under the previous regime.
Consequently, the composition of the first democratic parliaments partly con-
tributed to the comparatively high turnover of MPs that has occurred since then.
Each successive parliament in the region has been largely comprised of different
MPs, which undermines the ability of MPs over the long term to specialise in spe-
cific areas or issues and hinders legislative continuity and stability. Many of the for-
mer dissidents and the majority of artists did not view their position as MPs in
terms of a life-long career, and they consequently did not even seek re-election.
Moreover, the organisational instability of political parties and the relatively high
level of electoral volatility has meant that incumbency rates among the CEE parlia-
mentarians have remained relatively low, though perhaps not as low as in the early
years of post-communist transformation. 
For the most part there are no quotas pertaining to the representation of par-
ticular sectors of society in the new parliaments of the region. There are, however,
several exceptions, as Poland, Hungary and Romania have introduced measures
aimed at either guaranteeing or encouraging the representation of their ethnic mi-
nority groups [see Juberías 1998]. In comparison with the communist period the
representation of women has suffered, but the number of female MPs in parliament
is not uniformly low throughout all the CEE countries when compared to the Euro-
pean average. In June 2002, in the countries of Europe, including the Scandinavian
states, the average percentage of women in both houses of parliament was 16.7%
(see www.ipu.org). In the CEE countries, also in June 2002, this figure was exceeded
significantly by Bulgaria (26.25%), Poland (21.62%) and Croatia (20.53%), and
matched by both Latvia (17%) and Estonia (17.82%). However, both Hungary (9.07%)
and Lithuania (10.64%) were well below the European average. 
In CEE countries generally the position of MP is acquiring the attributes of po-
litical professionalism. The shift towards professional MPs and politicians has been
furthered by significant increases in the salaries of MPs, the introduction of travel
and accommodation allowances, and by a general improvement in their working
conditions, for instance, with the creation of new parliamentary buildings. Croatia
is a good example of dramatic developments, as the position of MP was given pro-
fessional full-time status, accompanied by a full salary, in 1992, shortly before the
elections to the second post-communist parliament. Until then, MPs had only been
entitled to per diem payments and other small reimbursements of costs. These
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changes mean that being an MP is now a lucrative job, which makes parliamentar-
ians more dependent on their party organisations and also less likely to defect from
the party or even to vote against it. In addition, professionalism empowers parlia-
mentarians in the region to perform their representative duties on a more consistent
and solid basis. It improves the conditions for serving both the sectarian interests of
various social, religious, professional and sectoral organisations, and the territorial
interests of an MP’s constituency. 
Finally, the institutional context in which individual MPs operate has been
consolidated and is now fixed. It is more difficult now for an MP to leave a party
and/or to set up a completely new party. In Hungary, for example, the number of
MPs required to form a parliamentary party and thus also to receive a financial sub-
sidy and other administrative support from the parliamentary budget was raised
from ten to fifteen in recent years [Ilonszki 2000]. Similar measures have been in-
troduced in the Czech Republic, where parliamentary parties newly formed during
the legislative term do not moreover receive any financial subsidy from the parlia-
mentary budget [Kopecký 2001]. In the Polish Sejm – the parliament perhaps most
notorious for party fragmentation – the minimum number of MPs required to form
a parliamentary party (klub) has also been increased, from the initial three to fifteen.
It was in Poland also that during the second legislative term several MPs from every
parliamentary party but one were expelled for breaking with voting discipline [van
der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 2000]. Indeed, expulsions of MPs have occurred in all
countries in the region, and this indicates that parliamentary parties and their lead-
erships have obtained at least some leverage to control the behaviour of their mem-
bers. The picture of flux and instability that dominated in most accounts of the first
democratic parliaments in the region [e.g. Remington 1994; Ágh 1994; Longley and
Zajc 1998] has now given way to accounts that stress the emergence of distinct par-
liamentary cultures, settled institutional structures and established parliamentary
routines.
Executive-legislative relations
As in the relationship between parliament and the electorate, formal rules largely
shape the development of executive-legislative relations. Interestingly, the dominant
model of executive-legislative relations in the CEE region is the parliamentary sys-
tem of government with a weak formal president (head of state) and a government
that is dependent on legislative confidence. This development is opposite that in
most Latin American countries and many of the post-Soviet republics. Indeed, in
the CEE context Romania is an exception as a country with a semi-presidential sys-
tem of government, in which the head of state possesses significant powers vis-à-vis
both the government and parliament. Several other countries in the region, like
Poland and Croatia, also initially adopted a semi-presidential system, modelled on
the French Fifth Republic, but eventually introduced constitutional reforms (Poland
in 1997 and Croatia in 2000) to create a parliamentary system of government.
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It can generally be claimed that CEE parliaments enjoyed significant advan-
tages over their respective governments in the early years of transition. This made
legislatures appear stronger and more powerful in the matrix of executive-legislative
relations than the legislatures of the established parliamentary democracies of
Western Europe were. First, the parties that formed governing coalitions in the re-
gion were seldom able to achieve or impose party loyalty among their MPs. In ad-
dition, owing to strong political polarisation, coalition partners often quarrelled
with each other, sometimes to such an extent that part of the government voted with
the opposition in parliament. In some countries, such as the Czech Republic (to
1996) or Hungary, this did not lead to any significant governmental instability, but
perhaps only because the parties in the opposition suffered even more from splits
and flux than the parties in the government. However, in countries like Estonia,
Latvia, and Poland, during the first post-communist decade the governments lasted
on average less than one year, a figure well below the European average of 1.9 years
[Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001].
Second, the frequent domestic conflicts between the governments (prime min-
isters) and presidents in the CEE countries undermined executive cohesion. The
highly charged relationship between the former Polish president Lech Walesa and
several of the Polish governments between 1990 and 1995 is a good example [see
van der Meer Krok-Paskowska 2000]. Arguably, these conflicts sent the Polish po-
litical elite back to the drawing board to alter the ‘Little Constitution’ so as to sub-
stantially curb the powers of the president. Disagreements over political issues, per-
sonnel questions and executive powers were also behind the destabilising conflicts
that existed between, respectively, presidents and prime ministers Zhelev and Dim-
itrov in Bulgaria, Illiescu and Roman in Romania, and Göncz and Antall in Hungary
during the first half of the 1990s [e.g. Baylis 1996]. The conflict between the former
president Kováč and the former prime minister Mečiar in Slovakia between 1994
and 1998 led not only to changes in the constitutional framework, but even result-
ed in the government being implicated in the kidnapping of president’s son
[Kopecký 2001]. Parliaments of course benefited most from these conflicts, because
in the absence of cohesive executive leadership they were less vulnerable to de-
mands to cede powers to either presidents or governments. 
Third, largely as a result of the communist legacy, the executive was not in a po-
sition to exercise effective authority in the political system [Goetz and Wollmann
2001]. The communist regimes established or often just extended the tradition of hav-
ing a strong executive, with power concentrated in the hands of a small ruling elite.
However, they also created (or continued) a system of government that comprised a
massive network of bureaucracies, agencies and planning bureaus. Under commu-
nism, the chief task of the central bodies of government was to implement and ad-
minister policies that had been decided elsewhere. As a result, the post-communist
executive was institutionally fragmented. The structures of central government had
been subordinate to the parallel Communist Party apparatus under the previous
regime and they were therefore poorly equipped to take the lead in government deci-
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sion-making in the new regimes. In addition, state administrative personnel, heavily
politicised by the previous regime, were not capable of providing the executive with
sufficient support to draft and implement policies. Unfortunately, the administrative
resources that parliaments as a whole and the individual MPs in particular had to
draw on were no larger or better than those of the executive [Olson 1997]. 
This means not only that the governments or presidents were initially unable
to create and maintain the executive dominance that is typical for the established
democracies of Western Europe, but also that the overall quality of legislation has
been poor, as is evident from the frequent amendments and changes to existing
laws that characterises the legislative process in the region. The quality of the legis-
lation was of course also not helped by the fact parliaments in the region were ini-
tially confronted with an enormous amount of legislation that they were required to
process within a short period of time. 
The civil service in CEE countries is still considerably politicised [Grzymala-
Busse 2003]. Nevertheless, the position of governments has generally improved
throughout the region, to the extent where the balance of power between the exec-
utive and the legislature increasingly favours the former. Several elements have
been involved in this shift. First, as mentioned above, parties and party systems are
much more stable than they were in the early years of transition. This has enabled
political leaders to better organise the relationship between the executive and leg-
islative branches and to impose some party discipline and cohesion [Ágh 1995; Ma-
lová and Siváková 1996]. The internal organisation of parliament has therefore also
become gradually more stable, especially given the fact that parliamentary party
clubs themselves dominate the party as a whole. Political party leadership often
consists of a large group of members of the parliament, which means that conflicts
between the parliamentary party faction and the external party are often less visi-
ble or less existent than in many established democracies. 
The second key element in the changing balance of power between executives
and legislative assemblies in the region has been the formation of the core execu-
tive, centred on the head of government. Reform of central government and state
administration has been carried out to varying degrees in almost all the countries of
the region. Its refashioning has enabled the executive to extend and consolidate its
position around powerful institutions, most notably the council of ministers and the
minister of finance [Goetz and Wollman 2001]. These changes at the executive lev-
el have certainly not led to the disempowerment of legislatures, which continue to
wield at least some oversight authority over the executive branch. However, the in-
stitutional resources that are now at the disposal of the executives tend to outweigh
the resources of the legislatures.
Finally, the balance of power between the executives and the legislative as-
semblies has been greatly affected by the processes of European integration. Most
countries in the CEE region sought speedy accession to the EU. Eight post-commu-
nist countries joined in May 2004, while others, most notably Romania, Bulgaria and
Croatia, are likely to join in or shortly after 2007. Preparing for accession to the EU
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is, politically and administratively, a very lengthy and complicated process, which
requires candidate states to comply with a host of conditions specified by the Euro-
pean Commission (the so-called Copenhagen criteria of 1993). EU membership is
conditional on the adoption of the body of EU laws contained in the acquis commu-
nautaire. 
This process had a significant impact on governance in CEE countries in gen-
eral and on the reform of central administration in particular [Grabbe 2001]. For ex-
ample, the EU demanded that candidate states implement reform to create a politi-
cally neutral civil service capable of both effectively transposing the acquis commu-
nautaire and providing efficient support for a democratically elected government
[e.g. Verheijen 1999]. It is of course still too early to assess how well these reforms,
now in effect in all the new EU member states, succeeded in achieving their objec-
tives, particularly that of empowering the core executive. However, it is interesting
to note, for example, that pressures to meet the demands from the EU has already
led to the professionalisation of central administration in key policy areas, and this
in turn has created ‘islands of excellence’ within the civil service [Goetz 2001].
The position of the executive in the region has moreover been significantly
strengthened vis-à-vis the parliaments by the introduction of fast-track legislative
procedures. This relates again to the transposition of the acquis communautaire and
its 9000 items of legislation. It would be inconceivable for such a vast number of
laws to be adopted through normal legislative procedures, especially those inherit-
ed from the communist past. The CEE countries that sought or are still seeking EU
membership had to amend their rules of procedure (i.e. standing orders) and treat
(some) EU-related laws as a legislative priority (Bulgaria), or even call extraordinary
parliamentary sessions to speed up the process (Slovenia). In addition, the man-
agement of EU accession was itself highly centralised and it concentrated all re-
sponsibilities in the hands of the governments [Lippert, Umbach and Wessels 2001].
Taken together, it is not surprising that these procedures and processes privileged
the executive branch and consequently reduced the independent policy-making ca-
pacity of parliaments.
Conclusion
The first post-communist parliaments experienced numerous problems that typi-
cally affect institutions in transition societies. They initially had to function under a
provisional or highly disputed constitutional framework. They were constrained in
their actions by their own as yet unsettled internal procedures, by the presence of
inexperienced MPs, and by the fragmentary character of parliamentary parties at
the time. They were also under significantly less external control from established
political parties and powerful interest groups and less influenced by strong execu-
tives, as these institutions were still underdeveloped or in the process of transition.
The bulk of scholarship on the first post-communist parliaments reflected this tran-
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sitory state of affairs in research predominantly on the role of parliaments in the
transition to democracy, in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and in establishing
the norms and procedures of new democracy [Remington 1994; Olson and Norton
1996; Ágh and Ilonszki 1996]. 
The contemporary parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe are different.
Their internal structures and procedures are more defined and settled. Legislative
tasks are performed in an increasingly routine process. The system of parliamentary
committees is in place. Large groups of MPs have by now served for one or more
parliamentary terms, which together with the generally improved conditions for
MPs’ work have contributed to stability and continuity in the legislative process.
Parliamentary parties have also become more accepted as the means whereby par-
liament and individual MPs organise the legislature’s operations. It is partly as a re-
sult of these political developments that legislative studies on contemporary CEE
parliaments have come to resemble studies on parliaments in already established
democracies [Olson and Crowther 2002]. Indeed, this special issue of the Czech So-
ciological Review, focusing on a classic topic of legislative research, is a poignant re-
minder of how far legislative scholarship on the region has already become inte-
grated in the mainstream of parliamentary research. 
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